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ABSTRACT
Authority systems in formal organizations can be analyzed in 
terms of the process by which the performance of organizational participants 
is evaluated. Authority is viewed as authorization to attempt to control 
the behavior of others, and rests in four different kinds of authority rights 
which embody components of the evaluation process. Authority systems are 
defined in terms of the distribution of these rights among participants.
The theory specifies certain problems which, if they arise in the 
evaluation process, render the authority system incompatible with partici­
pants1 achievement of satisfactory evaluations. Incompatible authority 
systems are postulated to be unstable and to remain so until the 
incompatibility is resolved. A set of indices is developed for the 
identification of unstable systems. This theory is the basis of a current 
study of authority systems in five organizations.
W. Richard Scott is associate professor and Sanford M. Dornbusch is 
professor of sociology at Stanford University. Bruce C. Busching is assistant 
professor of sociology at the University of Wisconsin and James D. Laing is 
assistant professor of political science at Stanford University.
This paper presents (1) a conception of authority and authority 
systems, and (2) a theory predicting the instability of certain kinds of 
authority systems. Empirical studies designed to explore the utility of the 
conception and to test hypotheses derived from the theory are presently under 
way in a number of organizations. In a forthcoming monograph and later 
papers, we shall discuss the operationalization of our concepts and report 
empirical findings.
The conception of authority presented here is based on the process 
by which performance evaluations of organizational participants are made.
This conception is separately emphasized in this paper because we believe it 
will prove to be useful as a descriptive and analytic tool, independent of 
the theory. Our intent has been to develop a formulation which is suffi­
ciently abstract to be applicable to a large variety of concrete systems in 
many types of organizations and specific enough to be useful in guiding the 
collection of empirical data.
The theory locates certain inconsistencies and deficiencies in the 
ways in which the performance of an organizational participant is evaluated 
which render the authority system incompatible with the participant's 
achievement of his personal goals. This incompatibility is predicted to be 
a sufficient condition for internal pressures for change in the authority 
system--in short, for instability of the system.
Both conception and theory are limited in scope to organizations 
which fulfill these conditions:
1) Organizational sanctions are distributed, at least in 
part, on the basis of evaluations made of participants.
2) Evaluators who influence the distribution of organizational 
sanctions attempt to base their evaluations, at least in 
part, on the performance of organizational tasks by 
participants.
3) Participants place some value on the evaluations of their 
task performance made by these evaluators.
The first and second conditions delineate the kind of organizations 
to which this conception of authority applies. The first condition excludes 
organizations in which sanctions are distributed independently of any 
evaluations of participants. (For example, all rewards are distributed 
equally among participants.) The second condition excludes organizations in 
which, although sanctions may be distributed on the basis of evaluations, 
no attempt is made to base these evaluations even in part on how well or how 
poorly participants perform in organizational tasks. Thus, this condition 
excludes organizations in which evaluations are based entirely on status 
characteristics (such as ethnicity or seniority) or on other non-performance 
criteria, even though in some cases these criteria may be related to per­
formance. We believe, however, that these conditions exclude very few 
organizations, at least in industrialized societies.
The third condition provides the motivational base for the theory. 
While this condition does not require that participants place some value on 
the organizational sanctions themselves, it does require that they value the 
performance evaluations made of them by those who influence these sanctions. 
If performance evaluations were inconsequential to participants, they could 
smile at negative evaluations and could hardly be expected to become con­
cerned about inadequacies in the way performance evaluations are made. (A
rich boy working as a lark, for example.) We believe this condition, like
the first two, is not very limiting. In an organizational context, most
participants value their performance evaluations because at least some of
the attendant sanctions are important to them. Furthermore, performance
evaluations often possess symbolic value of their own, in part because of
otheir importance to the development and maintenance of self-conception.
Although based on the work of literally dozens of predecessors, 
the conception described here contains some elements of novelty. We shall 
discuss comparisons with previous perspectives after defining our concepts, 
then complete the presentation of the theory.
Authority as Authorized Control
We employ in this paper a concept of authority which is defined in 
terms of authorization to engage in certain control attempts. One participant 
has authority over another to the extent that his control attempts are 
"authorized"--i.e., would be supported by the organization. A participant 
who is authorized to perform a given control attempt over another is said 
to have an authority right over the other with regard to that attempt. We 
identify four different kinds of control attempts, which when authorized 
constitute authority rights.
The process by which the performance of organizational participants 
is evaluated plays two major roles in this concept of authority. First, 
its importance is seen in the types of control attempts upon which we focus. 
These control attempts, and hence the authority rights themselves, are 
chosen to embody the major components of the evaluation process: allocating, 
criteria setting, sampling, and evaluating. These four rights are not 
separated as a logical exercise. They are often assigned in various com­
binations to different participants. (The superintendent may allocate the
job, engineers may set the criteria for acceptable tolerance limits, fore­
men may select the sample to be evaluated, and inspectors may be the 
evaluators.) Also, each of these rights can become a locus of problems 
in the authority system. Although other rights can be constructed within 
the general definition of an authority right, we consider this set 
sufficient for the analysis of most authority systems.
The second major role of the evaluation process in this concept of 
authority is that authorization stems from significant évaluators--those 
whose evaluations influence the distribution of organizational sanctions.
By definition, A is said to have an authority right to exercise a given 
control attempt over B with respect to a given task to the extent that:
1) the significant evaluators of A, if aware that A was 
attempting this kind of control over JÎ, would not nega­
tively evaluate A for making the attempt, and
2) the significant evaluators of all participants whose 
compliance is necessary for the success of A's attempt to 
control B, if aware of noncompliance to the attempt, would 
negatively evaluate those not complying.
Note that this general definition allows for varying degrees of 
authorization. A has an authority right to the extent that he is not nega­
tively evaluated by significant evaluators for attempting control, and to 
the extent that others are required by significant evaluators to comply with 
his attempts. A's authorization is incomplete if, for example, some 
evaluators require, while others prohibit, compliance with A's control 
attempts. Later we shall consider problems arising from incomplete 
authorization.
Authority Rights
Now we can define four authority rights by applying the above general 
definition to each of the kinds of control attempts. The first criterion 
in this general definition of an authority right applies consistently to A
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for each of the authority rights. Under the second criterion, the partici­
pants *?hose compliance is necessary for the success of A's control attempts 
vary according to the specific authority right under consideration and must 
be specified in defining each right. In these definitions, and throughout 
the rest of the paper, "evaluator" and "evaluation" refer only to significant 
evaluators and evaluations.
To assign a goal is simply to give an individual the task of 
attempting to achieve that goal. An allocating ri^ht is the right to assign 
an organizational goal to a participant. (A typist is told to type a manu­
script.) A has the right to allocate to B to the extent that: (1) A would 
not be negatively evaluated for allocating, and (2) B would be negatively 
evaluated for noncompliance with A's allocation.
Allocations vary in the amount of discretion they permit the re­
cipient in performing the task. To facilitate our discussion, we shall 
identify two polar types on this continuum. Thus, tasks may be allocated in 
two ways:
(a) by direction, in which the particular performance operations 
to be carried out are specified, leaving the performer 
minimal discretion in determining how to proceed (an 
engineering draftsman is given detailed instructions for 
preparing a blueprint of a mechanical component); and
(b) by delegation, in which only the characteristics of the 
desired end-result are specified, with the performer allowed 
to make the decisions on how to proceed (the draftsman is 
given much discretion in preparing the blueprint).
It is quite possible for occupants of a given position to have the 
right to allocate a given task only by directive or only by delegation. 
(Private physicians may be authorized to allocate to resident physicians in 
a hospital only by delegation, while the residents are authorized to allocate 
certain medical routines to clinical clerks only by directive.) Approximations 
of these two types of allocations can usually be distinguished empirically,
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but it should be recognized that rarely if ever are they perfectly repre­
sented. Directives cannot be detailed enough to specify completely all 
operations of the performance to be carried out; some decisions are always 
left to the performer. Thus, even the typist told to follow a standard 
format in the preparation of letters may still be allowed to determine which 
sheet of paper to use and the order in which the letters are to be prepared. 
Likewise, delegations do not usually allow the performer absolute discretion, 
although, if genuine, they will allow him considerable latitude in approaching 
his task. Many allocations:sound like delegations to a naive observer, but 
because they occur in the context of an understood set of "standard operating 
procedures," they are in fact directives. For example, when an intern is told 
by a resident to "Bring this patient's fever down," he may know from past 
experience that he is to carry out precisely a set of established procedures. 
Misunderstandings among participants can occur in these and similar situations, 
directives being mistaken for delegations and vice versa. Such misunder­
standings can cause problems at the time when task performances are evaluated, 
a point we amplify in a later section.
A criteria-setting riftht is the right to specify those performance 
properties to be considered, their weights or relative importance, and the 
standards to be used in determining a performance evaluation. Holders of this 
right, therefore, are authorized to determine which properties of the per­
formance of another will be considered and what evaluation is merited by any 
given level of performance. (For evaluating a manuscript typist, the criteria- 
setter may decide that, with no errors, a speed of at least forty words per 
minute is necessary for an evaluation of "good," and a minimum of sixty words 
per minute is required for "excellent.1') A. has the right to set criteria for 
B to the extent that: (1) A would not be negatively evaluated for setting
criteria, and (2) B !s evaluators would be negatively evaluated by their own 
evaluators for failure to use A's criteria in evaluating _B.
An outcome of a task performance is the actual end-result of a 
performance, in contrast to the desired end-result, defined by the goal. A 
performance evaluation may be based on (1) assessment of the characteristics 
of the performance of the task operations or on (2) assessment of the 
characteristics of the task outcome. In either case, information on the 
actual performance or the outcome must be obtained. A sampling right is the 
right to select aspects of performances or outcomes which will be observed 
to provide information for an evaluation. (For sampling a manuscript 
typist.'s work, the sampler decides to inspect every fourth page.) A has the 
right to sample B ’s performance to the extent that: (1) A would not be 
negatively evaluated for sampling, (2,1) B would be negatively evaluated for 
not allowing the observations specified by A, (2.2) the evaluator would be 
negatively evaluated if he did not use information from the sample specified 
by A in evaluating B, and (2.3) when the person actually taking the sample 
is not A himself, that person would be negatively evaluated if he did not 
take the sample A had specified.
An evaluating right is the right to decide how the level of per­
formance is to be inferred from the sample and to apply the criteria to 
arrive at a performance evaluation. (On the basis of number of completed 
pages, a count of errors in the sample, and the criteria that accuracy is a 
primary and speed a secondary consideration, the evaluator judges the manu­
script typist's work to be excellent.) Since, as noted earlier, we are 
speaking only of evaluations which are significant, participants holding the 
evaluating right are authorized to make performance evaluations which are 
considered in the distribution of organizational sanctions. A has the right 
to evaluate B to the extent that: (1) A would not himself be negatively
evaluated for evaluating B, (2) the sampler would be negatively evaluated if 
he did not provide necessary information on the sample to A for evaluating _B.
Authority Systems
We refer to an authority right which is regularly exercised by one 
participant over another as an authority link between the two. The sum of 
all authority links connecting two participants constitutes, by definition, 
an authority relationship betxieen the two. (For example, a project super­
visor may exercise all four rights over an engineer working on the project, 
and the engineer may exercise the right to evaluate technical aspects of 
the supervisor's performance.)
The constellation of all authority relationships of a participant-- 
both with others over whom he exercises rights and with those who exercise 
rights over him--with respect to a given task constitutes his authority 
system for that task. '(For example, the following relationships may con­
stitute the authority system of a resident physician in a teaching hospital 
with respect to diagnoses of patients assigned to his.service. His Chief 
Resident exercises the rights of allocating patients to him and of sampling 
and evaluating his diagnostic performance. Certain faculty members exercise 
their rights to set criteria, sample, and evaluate him. The resident himself 
exercises all four rights over interns, and also exercises the right to 
allocate tasks necessary to his diagnoses to nurses and laboratory tech­
nicians.)
In addition to examining an individual participant and his relevant 
authority system, we may also analyze authority as it is associated with 
positions. A position is a location within an organization whose occupants 
share a common organizational title and are members of the same organizational
context. (Occupants of the position of quarterback on the first string of 
the varsity football team; nurses aides on the Pediatrics Ward, for example.)
An authority link is structural at a given position if the link is 
associated with the position itself, rather than tiith only particular occu­
pants of the position. There need not be a complete correspondence between 
the relationships associated with a position and those associated with a 
particular occupant of that position. Exceptional competence, stupidity, or 
charm of a given occupant may produce discrepancies between his authority 
system and the system usually associated with the position. (A particular 
quarterback may not be authorised to allocate plays due to his inability to 
detect weaknesses in the opposition's defense, although other quarterbacks 
are not so restricted.) Authority relationships and systems are structural 
at a given position to the extent that the links comprising them are 
structural at that position. The set of structural links for a given 
position, i.e., that portion of occupants' authority systems which is 
structural, constitutes the authority structure at that position. Although 
more inclusive units of analysis can be constructed from these concepts, 
in this paper we define systems and structures from the perspective of a 
focal position and task.
Comparisons with Previous Conceptions
At this point, it is appropriate to state the ways in which the 
concept of authority we develop in this paper is similar to and departs 
from some previous conceptions. Because for an authority right to exist 
those subject to its exercise are expected to comply in order to avoid nega­
tive evaluations, and ultimately, negative sanctions, some may argue that 
we are studying power rather than authority. But our approach emphasizes 
the extent to xihich a participant is allowed by others in the organization
to exercise control. We have stated that A has authority over B to the 
extent that he is authorized to perform specified control attempts over B.
In essence, A is authorized to the extent that significant evaluators permit 
him to attempt the control and require the compliance of others with the 
attempt. This definition makes it clear that we are concerned only with a 
particular kind of power: that which is authorized by other organizational 
participants. Authorized power, reflecting the interests of interdependent 
organizational members, tends to be circumscribed in its domain and regulated 
in its exercise. In short, we propose to study authority systems as the 
distribution of authorized pother across persons or positions in organizations.
This view of authority may be compared with those of two influential 
organizational theorists, Max Weber and Chester I. Barnard. Weber1^ focused 
attention on the motivations of the subordinate group in his definition of 
an authority system as a legitimate power system: a system in which 
differences in power between A and B are justified by a set of beliefs which 
define the exercise of control by A and its acceptance by J3 as appropriate. 
Weber proceeded to show in his justly famous typology how differing systems 
of beliefs— traditional, charismatic, or legal--provide the bases for 
different kinds of authority structures.
Basing the definition of authority on the concept of legitimacy 
permits the investigator to explore the various kinds of "resources" upon 
which authority may rest. Many investigators have reported that perceived 
legitimacy may be a function of the technical competence or the interpersonal 
skills of an individual, as well as of his occupany of an organizational 
position. One perhaps unanticipated consequence of interest in the resources 
upon which authority rests has been a tendency to take the formal authority 




as embodied in informal arrangements. Approaching the study of authority from 
our perspective of authorized power facilitates consideration of both informal 
and formal authority, i.e., of both systems and structures.
From our point of view, legitimacy, if defined as the amount of 
congruence between the norms of subordinates and the distribution of power, is 
an important variable affecting the operation of an authority system. But 
legitimacy, in this sense, is not used by us as the defining criterion of 
authority. We wish to be able to speak of illegitimate authority systems as 
well as of legitimate ones. A given subordinate may acknowledge that his 
superior may exercise certain rights over him, and be supported by the organ­
ization in their exercise, and yet believe that his superior should not have 
been accorded those rights. That is, B may acknowledge A's rights and still 
question their legitimacy. Empirically, our conception, if applied in terms of 
the perception of participants, places emphasis on the question, "Does B believe 
that A has authority rights over him?" but at the same time permits the 
question, "Does B believe that A should have authority rights over him?"
Some evidence for the utility of this distinction between legitimacy and 
authorization comes from two experimental studies of authority. In the first, 
Raven and French^ reported that whether or not a superior was perceived to be 
the legitimate occupant of his office (elected to office vs. usurping office) 
did not affect the degree of public conformity exhibited by his subordinates.
In the second, Evan and Zelditch^ found that variations in the perceived 
competence of the supervisor did not significantly affect subordinates' felt 
obligation to obey. The compliance reported in these experiments was little 
affected by the manipulation of perceived legitimacy and may be interpreted to 
rest on perceived authorization. In the Raven and French experiment, authori­
zation could stem from the inaction of the experimenter who did not attempt to 
control or remove the usurper,^ and in the Evan and Zelditch study, from the 
presumed organizational support for the supervisor's decisions.
This is not to argue that legitimacy is an unimportant variable in the 
study of authority. We shall suggest below that perceptions of legitimacy 
have an important effect on the ways in which subordinates attempt to resolve 
incompatibilities in the authority system.
In some respects, our concept of authority is similar to that developed 
by Barnard.® Barnard's view that authority resides in the authenticated 
"authorized communications" from an office appears to be consistent with our 
approach. Barnard recognizes the importance of sanctions to participants 
through his emphasis on orders being acceptable to subordinates only if they 
are consonant with their personal interests. We would only add that if the dis­
tribution of sanctions is perceived to be affected by the evaluation process, 
then this is one important reason why evaluations themselves can become important 
to participants.
While our formulation is consistent with that of Barnard in these 
particulars, there are some important differences in the two approaches. Unlike 
our approach, Barnard's view of authority contains elements of legitimacy which 
supplement his concern with authorization: his "zone of indifference" argument 
places emphasis on what orders subordinates will accept automatically. The two 
approaches are also put to a different use. Barnard uses the distribution of 
sanctions (incentives, in his terms) in order to explain the continued 
participation of members in the organization. We also focus on the distribution 
of sanctions, as determined by the evaluation process. However, rather than 
emphasizing exclusively the decision to participate, we wish to account for 
one source of instability of authority systems which regulate the day-to-day 
behavior of participants.
One important feature of our view of authority which differentiates it 
from previous conceptions is its emphasis on the extent to which authority 
rights may be task-specific. A's authority rights over B may be limited to
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a specific task. In complex organizations, it is possible for an individual 
subordinate to participate in a large number of authority systems. For 
example, the authority system in which an intern in a teaching hospital par­
ticipates for the task of developing a therapeutic plan may depend on the 
manner in which the patient was admitted to the ward. For some patients, the 
intern reports to the patient's private physician; for others, he reports to 
an attending physician assigned to the ward. For other tasks, such as the 
clinical instruction of medical students, the intern may participate in still 
another authority system under the Chief Resident, and so forth. Non-task- 
specific concepts of authority encourage the investigator to over-simplify 
what in reality are very complex authority systems.
The close relationship between the evaluation process and authority 
which we emphasize has been implicitly recognized by many students of organi­
zations, although to our knowledge it has not heretofore been systematically 
examined. Some investigators have described evaluation systems designed to
9improve managerial control and have detailed how such systems can go astray. 
Others have examined the difficulty of establishing valid and reliable 
criteria for the evaluation of professionals. Vollmer^ has investigated the 
difficulty in evaluating the performance of research and development personnel; 
and Freidson and Rhea^־־ have studied problems in the evaluation of clinic 
physicians by their peers and the consequent difficulties in control by the 
professional group. Also of interest to us is the work of Jaquesl2 who has 
empirically explored the notion that responsibility can be measured by the 
length of time between successive evaluations by a superior. These studies, 
together with many others, indicate that we are not alone in recognizing the 
importance of the evaluation process for the study of organizational behavior.
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Incompatibility of Authority Systems
Our scope conditions indicate that the theory applies only to 
authority systems in which focal participants attach some importance to the 
evaluations made of their performance by evaluators who influence the distri­
bution of organizational sanctions. Given that a participant values performance 
evaluations, we make the important assumption that: the participant will 
attempt to maintain -- both achieve in the present and insure for the future ־־ 
evaluations of his performance at a level which is satisfactory to him.13 
The minimal level of a performance evaluation which is satisfactory to 
a participant is, by definition, the participant's acceptance level with regard 
to that evaluation. An individual's acceptance level may change over time. 
Acceptance levels also may differ among participants; some may be satisfied 
with a rating of "fair," while others are satisfied only with "excellent." 
Moreover, the particular level of evaluation which is satisfactory to the 
participant being evaluated need not be the same level which satisfies the 
evaluator. Some participants may have expectations for themselves which are 
higher than those their evaluators hold for them, while others may be satisfied 
with low evaluations even though their evaluators are dissatisfied.
An authority system can be labeled either compatible or incompatible 
with the ability of the participant to maintain evaluations of his performance 
at a level acceptable to him. If a particular aspect of an authority system 
acts to prevent the participant from maintaining his evaluations at or above his 
acceptance level, then an incompatibility is said to exist within the system.
Authority systems are incompatible to the extent they contain these 
incompatibilities. Thus, a compatible system does not prevent the participant 
from maintaining evaluations of his performance at his acceptance level. But, 
an authority system is incompatible if the set of exercised rights is either 
incomplete or contains conflicting elements in a way which causes the system to
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prevent the participant from maintaining his evaluations at a level satis­
factory to him. Systems may also be ranked by degrees of incompatibility.
In general, the more frequently incompatibilities occur for the participant, 
and the more important to him are the evaluations which cannot be maintained at 
a level acceptable to him, the greater is the incompatibility of the system.
If a given system is structural, then the structure may be compatible 
for some occupants of the position and incompatible for others because, as 
mentioned above, individuals may have different acceptance levels. For instance, 
a given structure may thwart maintenance of evaluations at the level of 
"excellent," but allow maintenance at the level of "good." Such a structure 
is incompatible only for individuals with a very high acceptance level, thus 
perhaps being incompatible for only a few occupants of the structure. An 
authority structure is incompatible to the extent that occupants of its focal 
position are subjected to incompatibility.
Sources of Incompatibility
The theory identifies four sources of incompatibility which can be
categorized as: 1) contradictory evaluations, 2) uncontrollable evaluations,
3) unpredictable evaluations, and 4) unattainable evaluations. These four
sources are expressed as four types of incompatibility.
Type I: Contradictory Evaluations
An authority system is incompatible if it places the participant 
in a situation in which the receipt of one performance evaluation 
at least equal to his acceptance level necessarily entails the 
receipt of another performance evaluation below his acceptance level.
This type of incompatibility is produced by a contradiction or mutual 
inconsistency between the evaluations of two different evaluators, or 
between two different evaluations by a single evaluator. The participant 
finds that doing the kind of work required to receive one evaluation high
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enough to satisfy him necessarily involves incurring another evaluation low 
enough to паке him dissatisfied. This problem may occur during the evaluation 
of a single task or of two or more tasks. (An individual may be negatively 
evaluated for not working fast enough; yet if he were to increase his speed, 
he would be negatively evaluated for not working carefully enough. Or, 
evaluators may expect a participant to perform mutually exclusive tasks 
simultaneously.)
This incompatibility may also occur when an individual receives 
evaluations both on his performances leading to an outcome and on that out­
come itself. In this case, the contradiction may occur between the kind of 
performances which are allowed and the kinds of outcomes which are expected. 
Such a contradiction frequently occurs when a participant is allocated a task 
by directives but evaluated on the basis of a sample of outcomes. In this 
case, an individual may be expected by an evaluator to achieve results that 
are impossible to achieve by following the particular course his allocator 
has directed. For this reason, a participant who receives allocations by 
directives is more likely to be subjected to an incompatibility of this type 
if outcomes of the participant's performance are sampled rather than the 
performance itself.
The more routine the task, the more likely that criteria-setters will 
clearly understand and agree on what can be expected of participants, and also 
the easier it is for the sampler to decide on samples which are representative; 
thus, the probability of Type I incompatibility is reduced xiith more routine 
tasks.
Complexity of the system also increases the probability of Type I 
incompabilitity. The more differentiated the authority system (i.e., the 
greater the extent to which each of the rights are separately held) and the 
greater the number of participants exercising rights in the system, the greater
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is the chance cf failure in coordination.■^ (For example, different allo­
cators may allocate conflicting tasks to a participant. If this conflict is 
not considered by the evaluators, the participant may be unable to avoid 
receiving an evaluation which is unsatisfactory to him.)
Type II: Uncontrollable Evaluations
An authority system is incompatible if it places the participant 
in a situation in which he receives evaluations below his acceptance 
level for performances or outcomes he does not control.
This incompatibility occurs when the outcomes which serve as a basis 
for the evaluation of a participant are not, from task to task, a regular 
function of that participant's performances. Therefore, to the extent that 
these uncontrollable outcomes are used as a basis for the evaluation of the 
participant's performance, he will be unable to control his evaluations through 
his performance. An incompatibility is formed if this lack of control results 
in the participant receiving evaluations below his acceptance level.
The most obvious and simple instance of this failure occurs when an 
unsatisfactory performance is noted and the evaluation is wrongly assigned to 
a participant who neither performed the task nor had authority rights over the 
participant who did. (A nurse may be negatively evaluated for lack of courtesy 
shown by an admitting clerk.)
Interdependence may be another source of Type II incompatibility. 
Interdependence is present, by definition, when more than one participant con­
tributes to a common outcome which is used as the basis for evaluation. If 
evaluated outcomes are produced interdependently, they may be related only 
irregularly to any given participant’s performance; therefore, that partici­
pant may not be able to maintain his evaluation at his acceptance level because 
he cannot control the outcomes on which it is based. A competent decision­
maker may be prevented from maintaining evaluations satisfactory to him due to
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incompetent implementation of his decisions by others over whom he lacks 
authority rights. (An automobile designer is negatively evaluated for the 
poor appearance of the final product, which is, in fact, the result of 
inferior workmanship.) Conversely, a participant who implements another’s 
faulty decision may be incorrectly blamed for an unsatisfactory outcome.
(The workmanship is blamed for poor appearance, although the design is at 
fault.) Interdependence does not produce incompatibility if the participant 
has sufficient authority rights over the other contributors to control their 
common outcome; nor will there be incompatibility if the performance of others 
is of such quality that the participant is not prevented from maintaining 
evaluations satisfactory to him. In summary, given interdependence, the 
probability of Type II incompatibility increases to the extent that evaluations 
are based on outcomes rather than performance, particularly for those partici­
pants who have no rights over those with whom they are interdependent.
Attributes of the task may also produce Type II incompatibility. All 
tasks may be considered to involve the overcoming of some type of resistance. 
Someone or something must be overcome. The resistance may be offered by 
nature, or by another person or group. (A problem must be solved. A tunnel 
must be dug through rock. A company must produce a better product than its 
competitors.) If the resistance to a given task is known to be relatively 
constant from performance to performance of that task, then the task is 
regarded as inert. (A mile is to be run along the school track. Bills are 
posted in a ledger.) But, if the resistance is known to vary from performance 
to performance, then that task is considered to be active. (The general must 
capture a city. An election must be won.)
In order to evaluate the outcome of a task performance, the evaluator 
might employ standards which criteria-setters have determined by examining 
outcomes achieved by other performers on tasks believed to be similar. In the
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case of inert tasks, a valid inference to the quality of the performance can 
be made directly from comparisons of the outcome achieved relative to outcomes 
obtained by others on similar tasks. Active tasks, however, produce diffi­
culties in the evaluation of performance, because the variability of the 
resistance complicates the problem of inferring the quality of performance 
from the nature of the o u t c o m e . ! h e  outcome of a good performance need not 
be victory and often is defeat. (The patient may die, even though the 
operation was performed well.)
We can divide active tasks into two categories based upon the degree 
of knowledge concerning the resistance to be overcome. First, even though the 
resistance is variable, it is sometimes possible to have specific knowledge 
about it for a particular task performance. (The strength of the opposition 
meeting the general in a given battle is known. A tunnel is dug through strata 
of known composition.) The evaluation of each task performance can thus 
validly be based on the assessment of the outcome, if one also considers the 
resistance encountered in that particular task.
In the second category of active tasks, the resistance encountered in 
a single performance is unknown, but there is some knowledge of the distri­
bution of resistance over a succession of performances. This knowledge permits 
evaluators to take a probabilistic approach to the evaluations of these 
active tasks. The proportion of successful outcomes can be compared to the 
results of other performances under like circumstances. (The death rate for 
all births provides a valid measure of obstetrical performance, but only if 
the sample and comparison group do not differ in the assignment of difficult 
deliveries.)
Thus, given active tasks, the probability of Type II incompatibility 
increases to the extent that evaluations are based on outcomes rather than on 
performances, unless the resistance is considered, or probabilistic
interpretations are made. Professionals employed by organizations are 
usually allocated more active tasks than are non-professionals. The pro­
fessional, therefore, seeks direct measures of the quality of performance; or, 
if results are used, he demands probabilistic approaches to comparable out­
comes.^
Type III: Unpredictable Evaluations
An authority system is incompatible if it places the participant 
in a situation in which he receives evaluations below his acceptance 
level because he is unable to predict the relationship between 
attributes of his performance and the quality of the evaluation.
The relationship between evaluation and performance may be unpre­
dictable because the participant has inadequate knowledge of how the evaluations 
of his performance are made. This incompatibility occurs when the participant 
has insufficient or incorrect information about the properties, weights, and 
standards by which he is evaluated, and therefore is unable to adjust his 
performance to maintain evaluations satisfactory to him. Those being evalu­
ated need not, of course, know all the details of the evaluation process, but 
only enough to be sufficiently able to predict evaluations form their per­
formance so that they can make the adjustments in their behavior necessary to pro­
duce acceptance evaluations. The extreme case of this type of incompatibility 
occurs when the occupants of a position act upon false information about the 
criteria used in their evaluation. (University faculty may be told and may 
act on the belief that community service, teaching, and research are all taken 
into account in the evaluations made of them, when, in practice, community 
service is not considered at all.) All those conditions which impede communi­
cation between the participant and his evaluators tend to increase the 
probability of Type III incompatibility.
Unpredictable evaluations may also be produced by an irregular re­
lationship between the participant's performance and the evaluations he
receives. To the extent that the sampler takes samples which are not repre­
sentative of performance, the relationship between a performance and the 
evaluation of that performance will be irregular. Thus, those organizational 
conditions xjhich increase the probability of unrepresentative samples also 
increase the probability of Type III incompatibility. For example, the more 
frequently a participant's performance is sampled, the less the probability of 
Type III incompatibility.
Type IV: Unattainable Evaluations
An authority system is incompatible if it places the participant 
in a situation in which the standards used to evaluate him are 
so high that he cannot achieve evaluations at his acceptance ltwel.
This incompatibility occurs when the participant lacks the necessary 
facilities to be able to perform at a level which criteria-setters require if 
he is to achieve evaluations at his acci :yLuacu li.'/el.'There fore, no dKitter how 
hard he tries, he cannot achieve evaluations satisfactory to him. Facilities 
may refer to a certain level of skill or training, or they may refer to 
physical equipment, such as tools.
Facilities may also refer to authority rights themselves. If a par­
ticipant is evaluated on his ability to control the performance of others, he 
must have sufficient rights and sufficient authorization to achieve the control. 
If participants are missing important rights, or if authorization is incomplete, 
the participant may find it impossible to achieve the degree of control 
necessary for the evaluations he considers satisfactory. (A university de­
partmental chairman may be expected to insure good teaching, but may lack 
important rights, such as the sampling right, over his faculty.) Thus, for a 
participant who is evaluated for his control over another, the greater the 
number of authority rights and the greater the degree of authorization of those 
rights, the less the chance of Type IV incompatibility.
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The problem of unattainable standards sometimes occurs when a parti­
cipant is new to a job but is expected to perform at the same level as more 
experienced participants. Also, it is more likely to occur if a task has been 
newly developed, and if tasks similar to it have not been performed often 
enough to allow criteria-setters to know what levels of performance can 
reasonably be expected.
Active tasks pose special problems for setting standards for the evaluation 
of outcomes. When the resistance varies, the evaluator requires knowledge 
of either the relation between specific degrees of resistance and the 
Ottfcomes, or knowledge of the frequency distribution of outcomes generated by 
past performances of the task in similar contexts. In either case, the 
development of standards for outcomes of active tasks requires a larger sample 
of outcomes from the comparison population.
Incompatibility Produces Instability
Instability refers to the state of a system. By definition, a system 
is unstable to the extent that it contains internal pressure for change.
Highly unstable systems, are, in short, in an "explosive" state and, as such, 
are highly susceptible to change. Stable systems do not contain internal 
pressures for change and, therefore, will change only as a result of external 
pressure.
We have assumed that participants will attempt to maintain their evalu­
ations at or above their acceptance levels and have identified four ways in 
which an authority system can be incompatible with the focal participant's 
ability to succeed in this attempt. Participants so thwarted can be expected 
to be dissatisfied with the system:and, therefore, are likely to engage in 
coping responses in an attempt to resolve the incompatibility. Some of these 
reactions to incompatibility represent the development of internal pressures
for change within the system. Thus the central proposition of the theory is 
that incompatible systems are unstable.
The theory does not establish that compatible systems necessarily are 
stable, for there are many other factors which may lead to system instability. 
For this reason, the theory cannot be advanced as a general explanation of the 
instability of authority systems. Incompatibility is considered to be a 
sufficient but not necessary condition for instability.17
There are a number of ways in which the instability of a system may 
become evident. We specify a set of responses by the focal participant which 
can be used to indicate pressures for change in the system. We refer to these 
responses as indices of instability, and believe the set to represent a 
sufficient variety of indices so that if a system is instable, the instability 
will be indicated by the regular occurrence of at least one of them. The 
indices are: dissatisfaction with some component of the system or with the 
system as a whole, expression of dissatisfaction with the system to others 
in the organization, suggestion to others in the organization that the system 
be changed, and noncompliance with the exercise of any authority right as a 
consequence of dissatisfaction xtfith the system.
The interrelation of these indices is complex. If instability is 
indicated by one index, the probability of its being indicated by another may 
be changed. (The use of suggestions by the participant may reduce his use of 
noncompliance as a vehicle for effecting change in the system.) But independent 
of this interrelationship, it is expected that the greater the instability, the 
greater is the probability that each index is present and the greater its 
intensity. Thus, we make the empirical prediction that the greater the 
incompatibility of an authority system, the more likely and intensely are 
participants to be dissatisfied, and to express dissatisfaction, suggest 
changes, and fail to comply with the exercise of authority rights.
There are a number of factors which influence the instability produced 
by incompatibility. One set of factors influences the form which instability 
will take in a particular system. For example, it is expected that occupants 
of positions with relatively high status in the organization will be more 
likely to respond to incompatibility by suggesting redefinition of the system 
components than will occupants of positions lower in status. Similarly, the 
absence of institutionalized mechanisms of appeal reduces the probability of 
suggestions for change.
A second set of factors influences the amount of instability produced by 
incompatibility. For example, we expect there to be a "compositional 
e f f e c t " ^  in groups in which a large number of participants are subject to 
incompatibility. To the extent that a participant interacts with others in 
systems similar to his own who are subjected to incompatibility, that 
participant may begin to perceive a threat to his own ability to continue to 
maintain his evaluations above his acceptance level. Even though he is not now 
thwarted by his system, he comes to believe that he may be so thwarted in the 
future, and is likely to begin reacting against his system. Also, in 
attempting to change his system a participant who is subjected to incompatibility 
may succeed in enlisting the aid of others who are not themselves so subjected. 
Such compositional effects amplify the instability produced by a given amount 
of incompatibility.
The Resolution of Incompatibility
The instability activated by incompatibility can be expected to 
persist until the incompatibility is resolved. One resolution is for the 
participant to leave the system, either by moving to another system or by 
leaving the organization altogether, as would be indicated by high turnover 
rates. Another resolution is for him to reduce his acceptance level to that whicl
־24־
can be maintained in the authority system as it is presently constituted.
(An incompatibility which produces an evaluation of ,poor'״ may be resolved by 
the individual changing his acceptance level to accept an evaluation of "poor" 
as satisfactory to him.)
We are particularly interested in the resolution process which is activated 
by incompatibility when the participant neither leaves the organization nor 
lowers his acceptance level. In this case, resolution can be achieved only by 
reorganizing the system, either by changing the existing authorization or by 
changing the exercise of one or more of the existing rights. Thus, the theory 
would predict that newly emerging systems, and existing systems in which 
incompatibilities develop, continue to "search" through various distributions 
of regularly exercised rights until a compatible system is achieved.
This process is influenced by variables which affect the degree to which 
attempts to reorganize will be successful. For example, incompatible authority 
systems which are perceived as legitimate are expected to be less likely to 
provoke attack and to be more resistant to attacks which do occur than are 
systems perceived as illegitimate. However, it is also expected that 
incompatible systems are more likely to become illegitimate than are compatible 
systems, therefore becoming more subject to attack and less resistant to change. 
The probability of success of attempts to change the system is also related to 
the degree to which the tactics utilized by participants succeed in causing 
others in the system to be subjected to incompatibility. (As an example of this 
contagion of incompatibility: if a participant resorts to noncompliance to 
relieve his own situation, he places others in an incompatible position to the 
extent that this noncompliance causes the others to receive evaluations below 
their acceptance levels.) Superiors are expected to be more hospitable to 
negotiations aimed at reorganizing the authority system if they are so thwarted. 
In the final analysis, it may be possible to argue that, in an authority system 
which endangers one man's evaluations, no man is safe.
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FOOTNOTES
*Our collaborators on the project are Joseph Berger, Santo F. Camilleri, 
Bernard P. Cohen, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. We are indebted for suggestions to: 
Kathryn U. Barchas, Patricia Barchas, Marjorie J. Seashore, James C. Moore, 
and Thomas R. Burns.
An early version of this paper, "Evaluation Processes and Authority 
Structures," was read at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological 
Association in Chicago, September, 1965.
^S.F. Miyamoto and Sanford M. Dornbusch, "A Test of Interactionist 
Hypotheses in Self-Conception," American Journal of Sociology, 61(1956), 
pp. 399-403. Also L. G. Reeder, G. A. Donohue and A. Biblarz, "Conceptions 
of Self and Others," American Journal of Sociology, 66(1960), pp. 153-159.
^This conception has characteristics which can readily be modified for 
other analytic purposes, (a) As we have indicated, other authority rights 
can be identified (e.g., the right to select personnel for occupancy of a 
given position). (b) A similar authority system model could be based upon 
evaluators whose significance is defined in terms of perceived importance of 
their evaluations to participants, whatever their influence in the distribution 
of organizational sanctions. Finally, (c) more inclusive authority systems 
and structures can be identified across positions or tasks.
^Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated 
by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford, 1947).
^Bertram H. Raven and John R. P. French, Jr., "Legitimate Power, Coercive 
Power, and Observability in Social Influence," Sociometry, 21(1958), pp. 83-97.
^William Evan and Morris Zelditch, Jr., "A Laboratory Experiment on 
Bureaucratic Authority," American Sociological Review, 26(1961), pp. 883-893.
^For a discussion of the analyzed effects on subject behavior of the role 
played by the experimenter, see Theodore M. Mills, "A Sleeper Variable in Small 
Groups Research: The Experimenter," Pacific Sociological Review, 5(Spring, 1962); 
pp. 21-28.
8chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1938).
^See Joseph S. Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR, (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of 
Bureaucracy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955); and Melville 
Dalton, Men Who Manage, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959.)
!^Howard M. Vollmer, Applications of the Behavioral Sciences to Research 
Management: An Initial Study in the Office of Aerospace Research, (Menlo Park 
Calif,: Stanford Research Institute, November, 1964.)
^Eliot Freidson and Buford Rhea, "Processes of Control in a Company of 
Equals," Social Problems, 11(1963), pp. 119-131.
12Elliot Jaques, The Measurement of Responsibility, (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1956.)
!^Alternative motivational assumptions could be considered in a similar 
theoretical framework. The participant's desire to have his evaluations be 
appropriate -- i.e. accurately reflect the skill and effort he invests in his 
task performance -־ is an assumption which may be added in future formulations.
14This reasoning provides a rationale for the "unity of command 
principle" of the traditional school of administrative management; incompatibility 
of Types II and IV is relevant to the traditional "responsibility and control 
principle."
l^Under Type IV incompatibility, we shall discuss the effect of active 
tasks upon the setting of standards.
1*’Everett C. Hughes has noted the probabilistic orientation of 
professionals in Men and Their Work (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press of 
Glencoe, 1958), p. 91.
1^It should also be clear that we are not studying effectiveness. Our 
empirical studies may uncover some degree of association between effectiveness, 
incompatibility, and instability, but effectiveness or productivity are not 
variables in our current theory. Indeed, a more effective structure may permit 
and encourage a higher level of certain behaviors indicative of instability, 
such as expression of dissatisfaction or suggestion of changes.
18James A. Davis, Joe L. Spaeth, and Carolyn Huson, "A Technique for 
Analyzing the Effects of Group Composition," American Sociological Review, 
26(1961), pp. 215-225. See also Peter M. Blau, "Structural Effects,"
American Sociological Review, 25(1960), pp. 178-193, Blau and W. Richard Scott, 
Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach (San Francisco; Chandler Publishir 
Company, 1962), p. 101, and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Herbert Menzel, "On the 
Relation between Individual and Collective Properties," in Amitai Etzioni, ed. 
Complex Organizations: A Sociological Reader (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1961), Chapter 16.
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